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Monetary policy which until recently aimed at targeting monetary aggregates has quietly 
given way to adjusting interest rates. Most of the Central Banks now focus on money reaction 
function that directly targets inflation or price level. This paper examines the way monetary 
policy is being conducted in the four major South Asian economies, namely, Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The analysis is based on a variant of the Taylor rule framework. 
Using quarterly data over the period 1990Q1 to 2012Q4, the study finds that the monetary 
authorities in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have accommodated some degree of inflationary 
pressure, whereas Bangladesh has continuously smoothened interest rate while setting its 
monetary policy. Besides pursuing a mild monetary policy stance against inflation, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka are also giving importance to foreign interest rate and real exchange 
rate movements to justify their relevance in monetary policy setting. However, the same has 
not been found to be true for Bangladesh.  
JEL Classification: E52, E58, E60  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is now well established in the literature that the ultimate goal of monetary policy 
is to maximise social welfare by maintaining low inflation rates and a stable output gap 
[Blanchard (2006) and Ahmed and Malik (2011)]. Besides pursuing price stability and 
economic growth objectives, the monetary authority has to ensure stability of exchange 
rate and management of foreign exchange reserves in an effective manner to circumvent 
fiscal distractions.
1
 Notwithstanding the clarity of these objectives, the entire effort of 
conducting an effective monetary policy is delicately poised as has been highlighted by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977). According to them, a purely discretionary policy setting 
leads to higher long run inflation—a clear evidence of time inconsistency problem 
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1For example, “maintaining price stability while supporting the highest sustainable growth” is the 
stated objective of monetary policy pursued by the Bangladesh Bank [Bangladesh Bank (2006, p.1)]. The State 
Bank of Pakistan outlines its objective as “(to) regulate the monetary and credit system in Pakistan and to foster 
its growth in the best national interest with a view to securing monetary stability and fuller utilization of the 
country’s productive resources” [Anwar (2012), pp. 2-3]. Similarly, the Reserve Bank of India also sets the 
objective of monetary policy as “maintain price stability and ensuring adequate flow of credit to the productive 
sector of the economy” [Bicchal (2011), p. 230]. 
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[Mohanty and Klau (2004)]. In such a situation rule-based policy is advocated as an 
alternative strategy to avoid high inflation on the one hand and to lower variations in 
inflation and output gaps on the other [Islam and Uddin (2011)]. According to Wimanda, 
et al. (2012), such a policy also allows to assess the past behaviour of monetary policy, 
recommend current policy actions, and predict the future direction of monetary policy. In 
case of rule-based monetary policy, the Central Bank plays an active role to offset 
adverse shocks and stabilise the economy.  
Following the seminal contribution of Taylor (1993), a large body of empirical 
literature concerning the optimal monetary policy has focused on the Taylor-type 
monetary policy rule using a variety of specifications. In simple terms, the monetary 
policy rule requires the Central Bank to adjust its short term nominal interest rate in 
response to changes in inflation rate and output gap [Molodtsova, et al. (2008)]. The 
Taylor rule predicts that Central Banks raise interest rate when inflation forecast exceeds 
its target level and when output gap is positive and vice versa [Bunzel and Enders 
(2010)]. These changes in the interest rate are expected to destabilise the financial 
markets through adverse impacts on consumption, domestic and foreign direct 
investments, exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves. 
Going beyond the Taylor rule, the Central Banks also experiment with additional 
nominal targets assuming that they also influence inflation and output, either directly or 
indirectly [Jha (2006)]. For instance, the exchange rate target fixes the inflation rate for 
internationally traded goods and thus directly helps in controlling inflation. However, the 
main drawback is that this approach leads to a loss of independent monetary policy stance 
[Obsfeld and Rogoff (1996)]. On the other hand, while monetary targeting enables 
Central Banks to adjust their monetary policy to cope inflation with the domestic 
considerations, its effectiveness depends on uncertainties, lag structure and the stability 
of money demand function which usually remains unstable due to instability of velocity 
of money [Jha and Rath (2003); Islam and Uddin (2011)].
2
  Finally, inflation targeting 
enables monetary authorities to directly respond to the shocks to the domestic economy. 
Inflation targeting is, therefore, more flexible strategy as short term deviations of 
inflation from its target level are acceptable and they do not necessarily translate into loss 
in credibility either. The inflation targeting is believed to improve accountability, Central 
Bank’s credibility, and enhance transparency. 
The empirical verification of monetary policy rule has been a favourite topic 
among researchers [see for example, Clarida, et al. (2000); Taylor (1993); Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998), among others]. For developing countries, particularly for the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries, the empirical literature 
is relatively scarce. The reason could be that these economies have switched over to fully 
flexible exchange rate system only recently after a prolonged use of fixed/managed 
 
2The presence of interest rate instrument primarily reflects velocity uncertainty—a major concern in 
many transition economies when money demand functions are unstable during a period of structural change and 
transformation of the economies. It can be argued that if velocity shocks are big, then the interest rate is a more 
suited instrument. However, if there is too much uncertainty in measuring the real interest rate owning to big 
shocks to investment or net exports, then monetary aggregate is the preferred instrument [Ghatak and Moore  
(2011)]. For example, a big fall in exports may lead to large depreciation in exchange rate and could necessitate 
a large rise in interest rate. Therefore, in the presence of interest rate volatility it is very difficult to measure 
equilibrium real interest rate. Hence, under interest rate rule uncertainty about the equilibrium real interest rate 
can translate in to policy errors [Ghatak and Moore (2011)]. 
 Conducting Monetary Policy in South Asian Economies: An Investigation  163 
floating exchange rate regimes [Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007)]. However, once these 
economies opted for the flexible exchange rate system, the only sound monetary policy 
option available to them for inflation targeting was the monetary policy rule [Taylor 
(1993, 2000)].
3
 As a result, one finds adherence to inflation targeting regime along with 
the monetary policy rule.   
Against this backdrop, the present paper is an attempt to assess the role of the 
Central Banks in conducting monetary policy by estimating a variant of the Taylor rule 
for four major SAARC countries, that is, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka using 
quarterly data over the period 1990Q1 to 2012Q4. The region has been selected for the 
simple reason that like many other developing countries, the South Asian economies have 
also introduced far-reaching financial sector reforms since 1990 onwards. We believe that 
the analysis of monetary policy has attained new importance after these reforms as the 
dependence of ‘local’ Central Banks on ‘leading’ Central Banks of the world has greatly 
increased. The evidence also suggests that due to external constraints, especially 
emanating from integration of international financial markets, the Central Banks of 
developing countries need to stabilise exchange rate movements in addition to inflation 
and output gap [Aleem and Lahiani (2011)]. In this scenario, a simple Taylor-type rule 
may not fully explain the optimal monetary policy because it not only ignores the 
dynamic feedback process but also assumes away policymakers’ ability to react to the 
more fundamental causes behind the output gap and inflation [Choi and Wen (2010)]. It 
is argued that a model specification different from that of the developed economies may 
be needed to analyse the monetary policy response in the South Asian region. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 specifies a variant of the 
Taylor rule. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses 
empirical findings, while concluding remarks along with policy implications are given in 
final section. 
 
2.  SPECIFICATION OF MONETARY POLICY RULE 
Incorporating recent theoretical developments, especially those related to 
propagation mechanism, we setup an augmented monetary policy reaction function. It 
incorporates foreign interest rate and real exchange rate movements in addition to inflation 
and output gap in the model specification. We start with the simple monetary policy 
reaction function, similar to one suggested by Taylor (1993). It assumes that the Central 
Bank set the target of short term nominal interest rate (
*
ti ) during each period. In the 
baseline model, this target rate is assumed to depend on the inflation rate and real output 
gap. It is also assumed that short term nominal interest rate is the main operating policy 
instrument and the inflation rate and real output are the policy goals based on the implicit 
assumption that the Central Bank retains autonomy to conduct monetary policy. Following 
Taylor (1993), the baseline monetary policy reaction function can be written as follows: 
tttt yii  )(
**  … … … … … … (1) 
 
3According to the IMF behavioural classification as of April 2011, information related to de jure 
exchange rate regime in the South Asia include: Bangladesh (Soft peg-crawl arrangements), India (floating), 
Pakistan (soft peg-stabilized arrangements), and Sri Lanka (soft peg-crawl arrangements). For further details 
[see Cavoli and Rajan (2013), p. 2; Rajan (2012), p.  55]. 
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where i is the long run equilibrium nominal interest rate, t is the actual inflation rate, 
*
 
is the target rate of inflation and yt is the real output gap or percentage deviation of 
aggregate real output (
d
ty ) from potential output (
p
ty ) at time t. 
The parameters   and 
 measure the sensitivity of interest rate to variations in inflation and the real output gap 
respectively. 
This rule indicates that when actual inflation exceeds the target rate of inflation, 
the Central Bank would try to calm the future inflation down by raising the target interest 
rate until inflation returns to the target level.
4
 For stability of this rule the reaction 
coefficient on inflation () has to be above unity. Then the aggregate demand function is 
negatively sloped with respect to the inflation rate. The coefficient of output gap () in 
the reaction function depends on the slope of the aggregate supply curve and weight 
attached to the variability of output in the loss function [Mohanty and Klau (2004)].
5
 The 
basic intuition of equation (1) is that the interest rate rule characterised by  > 1 implies 
aggressive responses of the monetary authorities to combat inflationary pressures. On the 
other hand, if 0 <  < 1, the Central Bank raises the target interest rate if the increment is 
not enough to keep the real interest rate from falling. This policy rule accommodates 
inflationary shocks in which more attention is paid to the short term trade-off between 
inflation and real output gap. A similar logic can be applied to the output gap coefficient, 
that is, an aggressive response to the output gap is implied if  > 0
 
and an accommodative 
response will be there otherwise. Since the target rate of inflation is assumed to be 
constant, denoting the equilibrium level of the real interest rate as r  leads to .
* ri 6
  
The underlying assumption is that the Central Bank may not adjust the interest rate to the 
target level instantaneously because a sudden policy reversal may undermine the market 
confidence. It usually takes some time to change the policy rate [Umezaki (2007)]. 
Therefore, we consider that actual observed interest rate (it) is partially adjusted to its 
target rate (i
*
) as follows:
 7 
 
tttt viii  1
*)1(  … … … … … … (2) 
 
4Similarly, when output is above its target level the Central Banks also raise interest rate till the rate of 
inflation is no longer above target. 
5For example, a flat aggregate supply curve implies that a policy shock to reduce inflation will 
significantly increase output variability, suggesting relatively small coefficient [Mohanty and Klau (2004)]. 
6It assumed that equilibrium real interest rate ( r ) is stationary and is determined by the non-monetary 
factors in the long run. Equilibrium real interest rate is also assumed to be constant and independent of 
monetary policy in the short run. Equilibrium real interest rate is the average real interest rate over the observed 
period, excluding the financial crisis period. In the original version, the intercept of the Taylor rule represents 
the sum of the equilibrium real interest rate and the inflation target and takes the value of 4, the inflation gap has 
the value 1.5, while the reaction coefficient on the output gap has the value of 0.5 [Pinkwart (2013); Osterholm 
(2005)].  
7Lagged interest rate is introduced to capture inertia in optimal monetary policy [Hutchison, et al. 
(2010)]. One reason of partial adjustment could be high uncertainty about the model parameters and, therefore, 
the policymakers have to act upon partial information. Another reason could be that if markets have limited 
capacity to hedge against interest rate risk, sudden and large changes in interest rate could expose market 
participants to capital losses which might raise systemic financial risks. The other reasons could be avoiding 
reputation risks to the Central Banks from sudden reversals of interest rate directions [see Mohanty and Klau 
(2004); Goodhart (1999)]. Pinkwart (2013) noted that the inclusion of the lagged policy rate on the right hand 
side is often found to improve the fit to the data.  
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The partial adjustment parameter  lies in the interval [0;1] and vt is independently and 
identically distributed (iid) random shock to the policy rate [Pinkwart (2013)]. The 
magnitude of the parameter  measures the degree of interest rate smoothing behaviour 
by modern Central Banks [Wimanda, et al. (2012); Pinkwart (2013)].
8
  Equation (2) 
implies that the Central Bank adjusts its policy rate by a fraction (1–) of its current 
target level. The gap between the current interest rate and the current target level can be 
represented by some linear combination of the one period lagged realised actual interest 
rate and its current target level.  Combining Equation (1) and Equation (2) yields the 
following dynamic version of the monetary policy reaction function. 
tttttt viyii  1
* )1()()1()1(  … … … (3) 
Equation (3) can be written as: 
ttttt viyi  1)1()1()1(         … … … (4) 
Where * r , and r  equilibrium real interest rate, it is the short run nominal 
interest rate which is used as monetary policy instrument Equation (4) implies that the 
interest rate (it) depends on the inflation rate and the output gap and plus its own lags. 
The target rate of inflation can be expressed as follows: 
1
*



r
 … … … … … … … (4a) 
The value of  indicates the Central Bank’s stance against inflation. Equation (4) 
describes the interest rate setting behaviour of the monetary authority in the developed 
countries. However, it is inappropriate to assume that the monetary policy is largely 
determined by the domestic factors only. According to Ahmed and Malik (2011) and 
Aleem and Lahaini (2011) the simple Taylor rule is not enough to explain interest rate 
setting behaviour of the monetary authority. In fact, as indicated, the interest rate setting 
behaviour of the Central Banks in developing countries is heavily influenced by the 
monetary policy stance of the major Central Banks of the world due to greater integration 
of financial markets and high degree of capital mobility [Umezaki (2007)]. Frankel 
(1992) argued that many barriers to the international capital movement across countries 
have been dismantled following the deregulation of the domestic financial markets. South 
Asian countries have taken a number of measures to liberalise their financial system in 
the early 1990s. These liberalisation measures are expected to enhance the efficiency of 
domestic financial markets and to make it international competitive. Moosa and Bhatti 
(1997) argued that financial integration greatly affects the behaviour of exchange rate and 
interest rate across countries, which in turn have crucial implications for the domestic 
monetary authority to pursue independent monetary policy. They argued that the more 
integrated financial markets the limited will be the scope for pursuing independent 
monetary policy. Khan and Sajid (2007) found that SAARC interest rates are 
cointegrated with the United States interest rates in the long-run. However, they found 
 
8Rudebusch (2002) notes that interest rate smoothing could be due to existence of persistent shocks in 
the economy or due to unobserved variables which are incorrectly omitted from the monetary policy reaction 
function. 
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low degree of financial market integration across countries within the SAARC region. In 
the wake of financial sector liberalisation, Chow, et al. (2014) acknowledged the role of 
foreign interest rates in domestic monetary policy setting. They argued that under free 
capital mobility domestic interest rates are determined by foreign interest rates. We 
believe that the Central Banks in the South Asian region give high priority to exchange 
rate stabilisation in addition to price stability.
9
 The possibility of default risks increases 
manifold when exchange rate determination is left on the market forces. This is true 
because foreign trade in these countries is ‘generally’ invoiced in such currencies as the 
US dollar, the British Pound, and the Euro, therefore, abrupt fluctuations in real exchange 
rates hurt the confidence of exporters and importers, which in turn accelerates the 
inflationary pressure. The pass-through effect of exchange rate on inflation through 
import prices is the fastest channel from monetary policy to inflation. Since, SAARC 
countries are heavily dependent on international trade and domestic consumption has 
high import content and these economies are susceptible to imported inflation. It appears 
from the literature that in the process of inflation targeting, management of exchange rate 
play fundamental role in monetary policy framework, therefore its role cannot be ignored 
[Chow, et al. (2014)]. The Central Banks may also respond to real exchange rate 
movements because exchange rate shocks affect their ability in achieving inflation target. 
Minimising exchange rate volatility enhances credibility of the Central Banks and affects 
inflationary expectations [Chami, et al. (2007)]. Shrestha and Semmler (2015) and Chow, 
et al. (2014) noted that emerging market economies seem to suffer from fear of floating 
in case of exchange rate appreciation and fear of loss in case of decline in foreign 
exchange reserves due to lack of credibility of the monetary authority. Therefore, 
emerging market countries have adopting a Taylor rule.
10
 Ball (1999) finds that inclusion 
of exchange rate in the monetary policy reaction function could improve macroeconomic 
 
9This could be due to the fact that when exchange rate pass-through into domestic price is high then 
monetary authorities give special importance to exchange rate management through capital controls 
(intervention), debt swaps and other exchange rate linked instruments to stabilize exchange rate expectations.  
Ball (1999) points out that if adverse exchange rate shocks cause sudden withdrawal of foreign investment from 
the country, then increase in the interest rate may be an appropriate response to stabilize inflation and output. 
Furthermore, exchange rate depreciation will increases external demand and prices, a tight monetary policy will 
reduce domestic demand and stabilize inflation [Mohanty and Klau (2004)]. In case of emerging economies, 
exchange rate shocks tend to be large and persistent which creates risk of overshooting the inflation target and 
losses credibility of the Central Banks. Therefore, defending the domestic currency requires raising the interest 
rate which causes large output losses. On the other hand, to overcome the negative effects of exchange rate 
depreciation, many countries try to minimize exchange rate movements. In this situation, monetary policy is 
constraint and plays an accommodating role to achieve exchange rate stability. The main reason of negative 
effect  could be due to the “origin sin hypothesis”  which suggests that exchange rate depreciation are costly in 
countries where economic agents are unable to borrow long-term domestically and cannot borrow abroad in 
domestic currency and are forced to borrow in terms of foreign currency. In this case, currency exposures 
restrict the ability of monetary policy to accommodate negative terms-of-trade shocks through nominal 
depreciation and thus derive up interest rate [Baqueiro, et al. (2001)].  
10Under the flexible exchange rate regime, monetary policy is independent of exchange rate policy 
because interest rate could set to achieve price stability, while at the same time nominal exchange rate could 
adjust to attain equilibrium in the external account. However, for small open economy like Pakistan which faces 
difficulties in letting the nominal exchange rate to adjust freely, an independent monetary policy may not be a 
feasible option. In this context, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) proposed the “fear of floating” and Eichengreen and 
Hausmann (1999) developed the “original sin” hypotheses. They argued that the advantages of a pure float are 
not attainable in emerging economies due to lack of institutional credibility. Therefore, these countries should 
adopt “hard peg” to solve the problem of credibility.   
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performance of monetary policy rule. He further argues that in pure inflation targeting 
regime ignoring the role of exchange rate is dangerous for open economy because it 
captures large fluctuations in inflation rate and real output. 
In the light of the above, we redefine the monetary policy reaction function for the 
SAARC Countries which simultaneously incorporates both foreign interest rates (i
f
) and 
real exchange rate movements (qt) as follows: 
ttt
f
tttt viqiyi  1)1()1()1()1()1(  … (5) 
The real exchange rate movement is defined following the short-run variant of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) condition: 
d
t
f
ttt eq   … … … … … … (5a)  
Where et is the logarithmic value of nominal exchange rate and 
f
 and d represent 
foreign and domestic inflation, respectively. Using customary notation of  for first 
difference operator, an increase in qt indicates depreciation of domestic currency. The 
Central Bank increases policy rate in response to a rise in the foreign interest rate if  > 0  
and is assumed to cut down the policy rate in response to an appreciation of real 
exchange rate according to the Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) condition. 
Furthermore, the Central Bank stabilises real exchange rate if  > 0. 
With necessary substitutions in the monetary policy function (Equation 5) and 
inclusion of levels dummy (D08) which takes the value one for 2007Q4 to 2008Q4 and 
zero otherwise to account for the effect of global financial crisis of 2007-08 on the 
monetary policy, Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
ttt
f
tttt vDcicqcicyccci   0861543210  … … … (6) 
Where c5 measures short-run effects and ci/(1– c5) measures the long-run response of the 
Central Banks. The coefficients of inflation (c1), output gap (c2), and foreign interest rate 
(c3) are expected to be positive, while the coefficient of lagged policy rate (c5) is expected 
to take positive value and vary between zero and one because it would take more than 
one period for the actual policy rate to adjust to its desired level. The sign of c4 is 
ambiguous because Central Banks may raise the policy rate in response to depreciation of 
the real exchange rate and lower the policy rate in response to appreciation of the real 
exchange rate [Hsing (2009)]. The policy rule given in Equation (6) differs from the 
standard Taylor rule because it incorporates variables including the real exchange rate 
movement and foreign interest rate besides the inflation rate and output gap.  
We contend that the inclusion of foreign interest rate and real exchange rate in the 
policy reaction function will allow us to determine the degree of the monetary policy 
autonomy. If domestic factors remain significant even after the inclusion of foreign 
factors it would suggest that the Central Banks retain their autonomy in the conduct of 
monetary policy. If the foreign factors are insignificant, the Central Banks conducts its 
monetary policy based only on the domestic factors without any regard for foreign 
factors. If both domestic and foreign factors are significant in the monetary policy 
reaction function, then autonomous monetary policy based on domestic factors is not 
compatible, unless exchange rate depreciation and foreign interest rate are not taken into 
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account. In this case a hybrid monetary policy reaction function could be useful to pursue 
sustainability of the domestic currency together with price stability and output growth.
11
  
   
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  The Data 
Quarterly data for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka over the period 
1990Q1 to 2012Q4 has been used for empirical analysis.
12
 Even though the standard 
practice is to use of discount rate as monetary policy instrument but due to changed 
monetary policy stance over the years in the SAARC region, alternative proxies have 
been used in the present study. The justification is as follows.
13
 There has been a shift 
from direct to indirect instruments of monetary policy in the region. Before 1990, 
SAARC countries have used cash-reserve ratio (CRR), directed credit programmes and 
statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) as instruments of monetary policy. However, after 1990 
many countries in the region have started to float several interest rates in the financial 
markets and there is no consensus on the best measure of the monetary policy stance 
among these various interest rates. Given this lack of uniformity, we have used the 6-
month Treasury bill rate as proxy for monetary policy stance for Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka.
14
  It is considered as benchmark rate in the money market because majority of the 
Treasury bills have a maturity of 6-months. The same has not been used for Bangladesh 
and India due to non-availability of data on 6-month Treasury bill rate. Instead the 
deposit rate has been used for Bangladesh and the overnight call money rate is used as 
proxy of monetary policy instrument for India. Finally, the quarterly values of US 
Federal Funds rate are taken as proxy of foreign interest rate. The four-quarter inflation 
rate (t) is calculated as: 
100)]log()[log( 4  ttt pp  
Where pt is consumer price index (CPI with 2000=100 as base year). Since quarterly data 
on real GDP were not available for all countries, we followed Goldstein and Khan (1976) 
methodology to construct these data. We have used the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for 
the real GDP data to obtain potential output ( pty ) which was then used to construct the 
output gap (yt).
15
 Real exchange rate (qt) has been calculated as logarithmic values of 
bilateral nominal exchange rates plus logarithms of foreign prices minus logarithms of 
domestic price level for each country. Increase in qt means depreciation. The US 
consumer price index (CPI with base year 2000=100) is taken as proxy of foreign price 
 
11Clarida, et al. (1997, p. 21) argued that in such situation the monetary policy rate determined by the 
weighted average of the domestic and foreign factors.  
12For Bangladesh data are available only from 1993Q3 to 2012Q4. 
13Two reasons for using market interest rate as the dependent variable. First, the standard regression 
analysis requires a continuous variable, but the policy rate (discount rate) changes in discretionary steps. 
Secondly, policy rate is not always the appropriate variable to correctly signal the stance of the monetary policy 
[Pinkwart (2013)]. 
14For India some observations on Call Money rate are missing that were replaced by the values of 
discount rate because of insignificant difference between the two. 
15One important characteristics of HP filter is that it is two sided and uses future information to 
compute the potential output.  
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level.
16
 The real exchange rate depreciation is calculated as qt = (qt = qt–4). All data 
series have been retrieved from the International Monetary Fund’s international Financial 
Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM-2013.  
 
3.2.  Data Analysis 
To understand the pattern of quarterly domestic interest rates, output gap, foreign 
interest rate and inflation rates in SAARC region, we plot data of each country in Figures 
1. We observe that SAARC interest rates are volatile with respect to Federal Funds rate 
except for Bangladesh. This shows that financial markets in the SAARC region are 
dependent on the FED’s monetary policy, particularly after 2000.  An evidence of pro-
cyclical co-movements between output gap and inflation rate is observed for all 
countries, which confirms that inflation increases with positive output gap. This could be 
due to demand pressure. Furthermore, output gap also remains negative during 
recession.
17
 Except for Bangladesh, inflation seems to be positive with respect to policy 
interest rate for other countries. After 2004 Pakistan and Sri Lanka appeared to have 
adopted contractionary monetary policy measures, whereas India adopted contractionary 
monetary measures between 2006 and 2008. However, Indian and Bangladesh interest 
rate show a declining trend in post-2008 period. 
 
Fig. 1. Trends of Domestic and Foreign Interest Rates, Output  
Gap and Inflation Rates 
 
 
16A bilateral nominal exchange rate is the spot exchange rates of each country with respect to US 
dollar. 
17According to the Taylor rule, monetary policy does not responds directly to inflation, and it also 
responds to the output gap which can be viewed as a measure of inflationary pressures. If actual real output falls 
below its natural level, the output gap is positive and the real interest rate falls, whereas if real output rises 
above its natural level, the output gap is negative and the real interest rate rises accordingly [Mankiw and Scarth 
(2008)].  
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The real exchange rate movements suggest that exchange rates in South Asian 
region remain volatile during 1990-2012. However, Pakistani rupee exchange rate seems 
more volatile than the other South Asian exchange rates. Therefore, Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka may target exchange rate together with the interest rate as an 
instrument of monetary policy to achieve output and price stability. 
 
3.3.  Correlation Analysis 
The correlation between policy interest rate, inflation rate, output gap, foreign 
interest rate and exchange rate movements are depicted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Correlation Analysis, 1990Q1-2012Q4 
Variable Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Interest Rate-Inflation Rate –0.11(–0.86) 0.33 (3.05)* 0.51(5.16)* 0.58 (6.17)* 
Interest Rate-Output Gap 0.008 (0.006) 0.12 (1.02) 0.04 (0.32) 0.03 (0.29) 
Interest Rate-Foreign Interest Rate –0.06 (–0.44) 0.36 (3.35)* 0.30(2.74)* 0.33 (3.02)* 
Interest Rate-Real Exchange Rate 
Depreciation 0.14(1.07) 0.34(3.17)* 0.31(2.89)* –0.06(–0.50) 
Note: Figure in brackets is the t-values. * indicate significant at the 1percent level of significance. 
 
It is evident from the correlation results that there is no significant correlation 
observed between policy interest rate, inflation rate, output gap, foreign interest rate and 
real exchange rate depreciation for Bangladesh. However, in India and Pakistan except 
for output gap, there exists a significant correlation between interest rate, inflation rate, 
foreign interest rate and real exchange rate depreciation. Similarly, for Sri Lanka inflation 
and foreign interest rates are significantly correlated with reference to policy interest rate. 
However, output gap and real exchange rate depreciation remains insignificant. These 
results suggest that except for Bangladesh other countries might be following some form 
of the Taylor principle.  
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3.4.  Methodology 
The presence of lag dependent variable on the right hand side of the Equation (6) 
may create endogeneity problem, hence the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 
remains inconsistent. This problem is mitigated by applying the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) technique which uses instruments that are uncorrelated with the error 
term. These instruments isolate the components of the regressors that are correlated 
with error term. To explain further, let Z be the vector of instruments with T  l order 
of matrix and l = 7 are the number of regressors including constant. The orthogonal 
moment conditions for estimation of the parameters of Equation (6) using GMM is as 
follow: 
0)(  v  … … … … … … … (7) 
The GMM coefficients can be obtained by minimising the following GMM 
criterion function: 
)()()(),( 1   yZZyyQ  … … … … (8) 
Where  is variance-covariance matrix defined by E(vv) = . The GMM criteria 
function is directly used to test for over-identifying restrictions. The two step GMM 
estimators are obtained as: 
yZZ   111 )ˆ()ˆ((ˆ  … … … … (9) 
For time series data, the matrix  may contain non-zero off-diagonal elements to 
capture serial correlation. The GMM estimator then takes the following form: 
yZ   111 ˆ)ˆ(ˆ  … … … … … (10) 
We used lagged value of the regressors as instruments in GMM estimation and the 
validity of instruments, which we evaluate by computing the Sargan-Hansen J – test of 
over-identifying restrictions proposed by Newey and West (1987).
18
 The rejection of the 
null hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to errors would indicate that the estimates 
are inconsistent. 
 
4. THE MONETARY POLICY RULE: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1.  Results of the Baseline Model 
Initially we have estimated a variant of the baseline Taylor rule to examine 
whether or not Central Banks of SAARC countries follows the Taylor rule. Table 3 
reports the results.
19
  
 
18 Lagged policy rate are not included in the list of instruments because they all are correlated with the 
residuals [Pinkwart (2013)]. 
19 It is worth mentioning here that in order to apply OLS or GMM the variable must be stationary [see 
Pinkwart (2013)]. The results of extended variant of Taylor rule based on the OLS are reported in Tables 2A, 
2B and 2C (see Appendix). 
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Table 3 
Empirical Verification of Baseline Taylor Rule 
Dependent Variable: it 
Variables Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Constant 1.70 
(1.64) 
3.09 
(2.16)
*
 
–0.29 
(–0.62) 
0.24 
(0.38) 
t –0.004 
(–0.24) 
0.12 
(1.02) 
0.09 
(2.04)
**
 
0.12 
(2.05)
*
 
yt –0.002 
(–0.05) 
–0.08 
(–0.47) 
0.11 
(2.28)
**
 
0.19 
(2.75)
*
 
it–1 0.80 
(6.26)
*
 
0.49 
(2. 63)
*
 
0.95 
(20.77)
*
 
0.90 
(10.49)
*
 
R
2
 0.81 0.27 0.72 0.86 
2R  0.80 0.24 0.71 0.85 
J – statistic 3.24 [0.778] 8.09 [0.232] 1.89 [0.930] 8.56 [0.200] 
Instrument rank  10 10 10 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the t-values. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 
10 percent level of significance. Number in [.] are the p-values. Instruments are: t–1, t2 and t–3, yt–1, t–2 and t–3, 
and Lrmt–1, t–2 and t–3. 
 
It is evident from the results that explanatory power of the estimated monetary 
policy rule seems to be reasonably good for Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, whereas 
the value of adjusted R
2
 is relatively low for India. However, the estimated model does 
not suffer from misspecification. The Sargan-Hansen J-statistic confirms the validity of 
over-identifying instruments used in estimation.  
It is observed from the results that the short-run coefficients of the estimated 
model are not in accordance with the values hypothesised by the Taylor rule.
20
 The 
results clearly indicate that Central Banks of SAARC countries are not following the 
Taylor rule principle in conducting the monetary policy in the short-run, although the 
coefficients of inflation rate and output gap have the expected signs and statistically 
significant in the case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Thus, we conclude that the standard 
Taylor rule does not apply to the major SAARC countries in the short-run. On the other 
hand, the estimate indicates that the coefficients of the lagged interest rate are positive 
and statistically significant with high magnitudes and vary between 0.49 (India) and 0.95 
(Pakistan). The coefficients on the lagged interest rate are 0.95 in Pakistan followed by 
Sri Lanka (0.90), Bangladesh (0.80) and India (0.49), implying that initial adjustment in 
the interest rate is only 5 percent in Pakistan, 10 percent in Sri Lanka, 20 percent in 
Bangladesh and 51 percent in India within one quarter. The degree of interest rate 
smoothing is high in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The main reason of high 
degree of interest rate smoothing could be the presence of financial crises, credit crunches 
and developments in commodity prices [Pinkwart (2013)]. This finding implies that 
standard Taylor rule may be useful only for interest rate smoothing rather than stabilising 
inflation rate and supply of output. This suggests that pursuance of interest rate 
 
20Taylor (1993) predicted the monetary policy rule as: it = t + 0.5yt + 0.5(t – 2) + 2. This rule assumed 
a constant real interest rate and long-run inflation target at 2 percent. However, as we set the real interest rate 
and inflation target equal to 2, the interest rate setting rule becomes: it = 1 + 1.5t + o.5yt. 
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smoothing is an important objective of the monetary policy in these countries. Another 
important finding with respect to Pakistan and Sri Lanka is that the response of monetary 
policy to inflation exceeds than unity. The long-run coefficients of inflation in Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka are respectively 1.8 and 1.2, indicating that Central banks in these 
countries do not accommodating inflationary pressures.
21
 The response coefficient of 
inflation is significantly greater than one in Pakistan and Sri Lanka which confirms 
stability condition for the Taylor rule. The long-run response of inflation to policy rate 
appears to be very weak and insignificant in India and Bangladesh, indicating perhaps 
their relatively higher inflation rates. The reason of this finding could be that the 
monetary authorities in India and Bangladesh may face some non-monetary policy price 
pressures in order to reduce the output costs [Mohanty and Klau (2004)]. The low and 
insignificance response of inflation rate to policy rate violates the stability condition for 
the Taylor rule. The response of output gap is negative and insignificant in the case of 
Bangladesh and India. One reason of this finding could be that a large chunk of real 
sector activities are not under the domain of monetary policy in these countries. The other 
reason could be that negative and insignificant output gap implies future declines in the 
inflation rate, which could destabilise the economy where the interest rate approaches to 
lower bound. Therefore, negative output gap generate a more rigorous response than the 
case when the gap exceeds the assumed target [Caglayan, et al. (2016)]. On the other 
hand, output gap seems to be positive and significant in the case of Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka which suggests that output exceeds the set target and demand pressure calls for the 
tight monetary policy in these countries, although the coefficient of output gap is less 
than 0.5. The long-run coefficients of output gap are respectively 2.2 and 1.9 in Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka suggesting that monetary authority also stabilises output besides in 
inflation in these countries in the long-run. Finally, in case of Pakistan the intercept term 
is negative but statistically insignificant. The negative sign of intercept term implies that 
either the real interest rate is negative or level of inflation target is high, that is, more than 
double of the real interest rate [Malik and Ahmed (2007)]. 
 
4.2.  Results of Extended Taylor Rule 
The results depicted in Table 3 suggest that simple monetary policy rule due to the 
Taylor (1993) is not appropriate to conduct monetary policy by major South Asian 
Central banks. It is now well established that in the era of globalisation with greater 
financial markets integration, the variants of the Taylor rule based on a closed economy 
framework perform poorly in an open economy unless they are modified to account for 
the movements in the exchange rates [Ball (1999); Caglyan, et al. (2016)].  Svensson 
(2000) argued that in an open economy setting there are various direct and indirect 
channels through which exchange rates can affect monetary policy and show that 
domestic inflation responds to foreign variables such as foreign inflation rate, exchange 
rate, foreign interest rate and shocks from the rest of the world [Caglyan, et al. (2016)]. In 
such circumstances, monetary policy in emerging economies may need to pursue multiple 
objectives such as economic growth, price stability, financial and exchange rate stability 
and had to pay more attention to the external constraint. Accordingly, Taylor (2001) and 
 
21The long-run coefficient of inflation in Pakistan is equal to 0.09/1-0.95 and for Sri Lanka is 0.12/1-
0.90. 
176 Khan and Ahmed 
Hsing (2009) have incorporating the exchange rate and foreign interest rate in the 
monetary policy reaction function. Filosa (2001) finds that most Central Banks in 
emerging market economies react strongly to exchange rates. Mohanty and Klau (2004) 
reported that Central Banks in emerging markets tend to look beyond inflation and 
output, and focus on other objectives such as exchange rate changes. Similarly, Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2007) and Adolfson, et al. (2008) show that exchange rate movements 
affect Central Bank behaviour. Furthermore, Umezaki (2007) demonstrated that 
international capital mobility also affect domestic monetary policy. It is appropriate to 
assume that foreign interest rate affect SAARC interest rates through interest rate 
arbitrage. Therefore, we have estimated the extended version of the Taylor rule specified 
by Equation (6).  The empirical analysis in the ensuing paragraph is on GMM results 
reported in Tables 4 to 5.
22
 It is evident from the results that the explanatory power of the 
extended model has been reasonably good for Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
whereas for India the value of adjusted R
2
 is relatively low. The estimated equations do 
not show any evidence of misspecification. The Sargan-Hansen J-test accepts the null 
hypothesis of over-identifying instruments. This implies that the instruments are 
appropriately selected. We start with the outcome for Bangladesh (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Empirical Verification of an Extended Taylor Rule 
Dependent Variable: it 
Variables 
Bangladesh India 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.83 
(0.62) 
0.48 
(0.55) 
–0.66 
(–0.55) 
6.86 
(3.54)
*
 
0.80 
(0.82) 
2.37 
(3.49)
*
 
t 0.05 
(0.43) 
0.03 
(0.90) 
0.04 
(0.42) 
0.36 
(1.89)
***
 
0.07 
(0.82) 
0.43 
(9.54)
*
 
yt –0.03 
(–0.24) 
0.06 
(1.24) 
0.05 
(0.58) 
0.24 
(0.78) 
–0.44 
(–2.77)* 
0.18 
(2.02)
*
 
qt 3.15 
(0.29) 
– –1.32 
(–0.17) 
22.45 
(2.73)
*
 
– 8.78 
(5.97)
*
 
f
ti  
– 0.07 
(2.72)
*
 
0.06 
(1.00) 
– 0.74 
(3.16)
*
 
0.25 
(2.23)
*
 
1ti  0.88 
(5.13)
*
 
0.89 
(9.47)
*
 
1.03 
(7.63)
*
 
–0.08 
(–0.31) 
0.48 
(3.78)
*
 
0.27 
(8.38)
*
 
08D  –0.55 
(–0.35) 
0.36 
(0.87) 
–0.24 
(–0.35) 
–0.96 
(–0.22) 
4.43 
(2.11)
*
 
–1.54 
(–2.04)* 
2R  0.75 0.85 0.80 0.09 0.33 0.28 
2R  0.72 0.84 0.78 0.02 0.29 0.22 
J–statistic 3.45 
[0.841] 
5.84 
[0.558] 
13.37 
[0.147] 
4.61 
[0.707] 
8.54 
[0.287] 
98.37 
[0.000] 
Instrument Rank 13 13 16 13 13 17 
See note below Table 3.  Instruments are: 32.132,1,32,132,1
,, 
 tandtttandt
f
ttandtttandtt
qiy and 
32,1  tandttLrm  
 
22 Since we are interested to determine the impact of exchange rate depreciation and foreign interest 
rate on monetary policy, therefore, we are much concentrated on model 3 in Tables 4 and 5. 
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The results reveal that for Bangladesh the coefficients of inflation and output gap 
possess expected positive signs but they are statistically insignificant in all specifications. 
This is not surprising because the Bangladesh Bank does not follow the Taylor rule 
principle in setting interest rate. Since its independence, the Bangladesh Bank has been 
conducting monetary policy with significant discretion. Islam and Uddin (2011) have 
argued that the Bangladesh Bank is still using broad money as intermediate target and 
reserve money as the operating target. Unstable broad money supply growth and inflation 
instability undermine the credibility of the monetary authorities and dilute the impact of 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the Bangladesh Bank did not gain much independence in 
terms of monetary policy formulation and implementation due to fiscal dominance. The 
Bangladesh Bank maintains that inflation targeting is not yet appropriate because the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism is not well developed 
[Hossain (2010)]. 
Real exchange rate depreciation is also insignificant in the monetary policy 
reaction function. This implies that Bangladesh monetary authority do not react to real 
exchange rate movements. In model 2 (Table 4), foreign interest rate appears to be 
statistically significant, implying the Bangladesh monetary authority reacts to foreign 
monetary policy although the response is too weak. However, it turns out to be 
insignificant when both real exchange rate depreciation and foreign interest rate are 
added in the estimation (model 3). The coefficient of interest rate lagged by one quarter 
exerts significant effect on monetary policy instrument in all specifications. However, the 
coefficient on the lagged interest rate is 1.03 (model 3), which implies that the initial 
adjustment in interest rate is only –0.03 percent and the degree of interest rate smoothing 
is 1.03 percent. Finally, it is argued that Bangladesh follow lax monetary policy with 
short-run and long-run coefficients of inflation rate, real output gap and real exchange 
rate movements are not significantly different from zero. In this context, Hossain (2010, 
p. 576) argued that “there is lack of transparency of the design and conduct of monetary 
policy in Bangladesh. Inflation targeting does not necessarily achieve credibility in an 
uncertain inflationary environment when a Central Bank claim bad luck, adverse shocks 
and extenuating circumstances in missing the inflation target, which can ultimately 
undermine a Central Bank’s credibility”.  Finally, to capture the response of Bangladesh 
Bank to global financial crisis, a dummy variable that takes value one for 2007Q3 to 
2008Q4 and zero otherwise has been introduced. The result suggests that global financial 
crisis has transmitted no significant impact on Bangladesh monetary policy. 
The results obtained for India suggest that inflation rate; foreign interest rate and 
exchange rate depreciation produces significant positive effect on monetary policy rate in 
all specifications. However, the size of the coefficients changes significantly when real 
exchange rate depreciation and foreign interest rate included in estimation. The positive 
and statistically significant coefficient of inflation implies that the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) has consistently strived to stabilise inflationary movements over the sample period 
1990-2012. The less than unitary coefficient of inflation suggests that RBI increased the 
policy interest rate by 0.43 basis points in response to a 1percent rise in the inflation. 
However, less than unity coefficient of inflation violates the stability condition for the 
Taylor rule in the short-run. Similarly, real output gap is positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that the monetary authority in India increased the policy 
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interest rate by 0.18 basis points in response to a one unit rise in output gap.
23
 However, 
the coefficient with respect to output gap is smaller than the coefficient of inflation rate 
which suggests that the aggregate supply curve in India is inelastic. This may indicate 
that inflation in India is governed by the cost push factor. This may also be due to 
inadequacy of the measure of output gap as Mohanty and Klau (2004) have rightly noted 
that estimating potential output is difficult as supply side shocks in emerging economies 
are relatively larger than that of developed economies. Despite these concerns, the results 
of present study are, nonetheless, consistent with the earlier findings of Hutchison, et al. 
(2010), Hutchison, et al. (2013) and Singh (2010). 
The coefficient of real exchange rate depreciation is although greater than unity for 
all cases, it turns out to be significant in the monetary policy reaction function. This 
implies that exchange rate plays a dominant role in the monetary policy setting in India. 
Ball (1999) argued that inflation targeting without explicit attention to the exchange rate 
is dangerous in an open economy, because large fluctuations in exchange rate affect 
output as well as inflation through import price channel. Large movements in capital 
flows and exchange rates force the RBI to intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
ensure orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market and prevent excessive exchange 
rate volatility that can induce further spirals [Gokran (2012); Patra and Kapur (2012)].
24
 
The main instrument of the RBI to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility has been 
active capital account management along with interventions in the foreign exchange 
markets [Mohan and Kapur (2009); Patra and Kapur (2012)].
25
 However, large and 
significant coefficient of exchange rate signals the effectiveness of exchange rate channel 
of monetary policy. Mohanty and Klau (2004) find that central banks in emerging 
economies tend to focus on exchange rate stabilising besides inflation and output gap.
26
 
Jha (2008) noted that even though price stability, output growth, reduction of exchange 
rate volatility, and financial stability are the monetary policy goals of the RBI, but none 
of these are fully under its direct control. The dominance of exchange rate changes in the 
monetary policy reaction function does indicate that exchange rate stabilisation in 
inflation targeting is a preferred policy choice for India. Mishra and Mishra (2012) have 
also hinted towards this based on similar results for India.  
Regarding foreign interest rate, the result reveals that an increase in the foreign interest 
rate will generate depreciation of the real exchange rate, which in turn putting upward 
pressure on inflation rate and hence on the domestic interest rates [Caglayan, et al. 
 
23 Positive increases in the output gap represent a rise in actual output relative to potential output.  
24 In 2006 committee on full convertibility of capital account firmly recommended to the RBI that RBI 
should maintain a monitoring band of +/- 5 percent around the real effective exchange rate and should intervene 
as and when the real effective exchange rate moved outside this band [RBI (2006)]. 
25 The RBI adopted multiple indicator approach in 1998 to maintain (i) a stable inflation environment, 
(ii) appropriate liquidity conditions to accelerate economic growth, (iii) maintain orderly conditions in the 
foreign exchange market to avoid excessive volatility in the exchange rate, and (iv) stable interest rate [RBI 
(2002); Jha (2008)]. 
26It is important to note that reaction of the exchange rate to an interest rate shocks depend on the 
nature of exchange rate regime and the degree of trade openness of an economy. In a flexible exchange rate 
regime, the exchange rate reacts more pronouncedly to an interest rate shocks. However, if exchange rate is 
pegged and heavily managed, it will not respond to an interest rate shocks [Aleem  (2010)]. However, India still 
placed many qualitative restrictions on the trade and capital flows.    
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(2016)].
27
 The result suggests that an increase of 100 basis points in the US Federal Funds 
rate is associated with an increase of 25 basis points in the policy rate per quarter in India.
28
 
This suggests that Indian monetary policy is significantly influenced by international events, 
especially from the US monetary policy actions. Though, this result confirms relatively weak 
degree of financial markets integration between India and the rest of the world. 
The response coefficient of lagged policy rate is positive and significant in model 
2 and model 3. However, the lagged coefficient of policy rate is 0.27 in model 3 
indicating a relatively low degree of interest rate smoothing with initial adjustment in 
interest rate is 73 percent per quarter. The long-run coefficients on inflation rate and 
output gap respectively are 0.59 and 0.25, which suggests that in long-run a unit increases 
in inflation rate lead to raise interest rate by 0.59 basis points and output gap by 0.25.  
These finding are inconsistent and violates long-run stability condition for the Taylor 
principle. Finally, our finding reveals that the effect of global financial crisis of 2007-08 
is negative and statistically significant which suggest that the RBI reacts to global 
financial crisis passively by loosening of domestic monetary policy. 
In case of Pakistan, the results are generally consistent with economic theory (Table 5). 
The coefficient of inflation rate is positive and larger than output gap in all cases which 
implies that the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has given more weight to inflation stabilisation 
than output. However, the coefficient of inflation rate is less than unity (0.19) which suggests 
that the SBP has accommodated inflationary pressures by increasing nominal interest rate by 
0.19 basis points in response to 1 percent increase in inflation rate in the short-run. The 
coefficient of output gap suggests that a one percent deviation of actual output from its long 
run sustainable level would raise policy rate by 0.12 percent. This variable is significant at the 
5 percent level. The result pertaining to real exchange rate implies that a one percent 
depreciation of real exchange rate increases monetary policy rate by more than 3 percent. This 
result confirms strong integration of domestic financial markets in Pakistan. Khan and Ahmed 
(2011) found that real exchange rate seemed to be a dominant source of variation in output 
and inflation in Pakistan. Foreign interest rate enters in the monetary policy reaction function 
with positive sign and it is statistically significant which confirms that the domestic financial 
markets are now relatively more integrated with the rest of the world due to a series of 
financial sector reforms since early 1990s. The coefficient of lagged policy rate is 0.86 which 
confirms a high degree of interest rate smoothing with adjustment in interest rate is only 14 
percent per quarter. The long-run coefficient of inflation and output gap are 1.36 and 0.86 
which confirms the stability of the Taylor rule in the long-run. 
On the whole, the results of present study are consistent with the earlier findings of 
Ahmed and Malik (2011) and Aleem and Lahiani (2011). The coefficient of D08 which 
corresponds to global financial crisis of 2007-08 is negative and significant which is quite 
odd given that the domestic financial sector was not seriously influenced by the global 
financial crisis and as such did not require loosening of the monetary policy stance. 
 
27The real UIP condition implies that a rise in the foreign interest rate will lead to an appreciation in the 
real exchange rate ( ).0
1
 t
e
t
qq  Given expected foreign inflation rate ( *
1
e
t ), an expected appreciation will 
be generated by an increase in domestic inflation ( e
t 1 ) and exerting an upward pressure on domestic interest 
rate. Hence, through this channel an increase in foreign interest rate will have a positive impact on domestic 
interest rate [Caglayan, et al. (2016)].   
28 In model 2, the coefficient of foreign interest rate is 0.74. 
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Table 5 
Empirical Verification of an Extended Taylor Rule 
Dependent Variable: it 
Variables 
Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant –0.001 
(–0.002) 
–0.70 
(–2.07)** 
–0.55 
(–2.86)* 
–1.27 
(–1.25) 
–0.64 
(–0.66) 
0.58 
(3.94)
*
 
t  
0.17 
(2.14)
*
 
0.14 
(2.74)
*
 
0.19 
(9.15)
*
 
0.40 
(4.81)
*
 
0.18 
(0.56) 
0.28 
(13.16)
*
 
ty  
0.11 
(2.18)
*
 
0.10 
(2.03)
*
 
0.12 
(12.85)
*
 
0.28 
(2.55)
*
 
0.10 
(0.86) 
0.25 
(6.99)
*
 
tq  
3.79 
(1.48) 
– 3.45 
(2.73)
*
 
0.39 
(0.26) 
– 3.45 
(6.36)
*
 
f
ti  
– 0.13 
(1.84)
*
 
0.10 
(3.32)
*
 
– 0.29 
(1.82)
*
 
0.11 
(2.93)
*
 
1ti  
0.86 
(10.53)
*
 
0.90 
(16.42)
*
 
0.86 
(47.20)
*
 
0.84 
(12.09)
*
 
0.85 
(11.78)
*
 
0.75 
(48.65)
*
 
08D  
–1.05 
(–0.66) 
0.21 
(0.29) 
–0.94 
(–1.80)** 
–4.51 
(–2.16)* 
–1.10 
(–0.42) 
–1.34 
(–3.38)* 
2R  0.75 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.86 0.86 
2R  0.73 0.72 0.73 0.78 0.85 0.85 
J statistic 2.55 
[0.923] 
4.61 
[0.707] 
11.77 
[0.227] 
6.46 
[0.488] 
4.71 
[0.695] 
17.32 
[0.185] 
Instrument Rank 13 13 16 13 13 20 
See note below Table 4. Instruments are: 32.132,1,32,132,1
,, 
 tandtttandt
f
ttandtttandtt
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The empirical results for Sri Lanka (Table 5) reveal that the coefficient of inflation 
rate, output gap, foreign interest rate and real exchange rate depreciation and lagged 
interest rate enter the monetary policy reaction function with expected positive sign in all 
specifications. It is interesting to note that in case of Sri Lanka the coefficients of 
inflation rate, output gap, foreign interest rate and real exchange rate depreciation are 
statistically significant (see model 3). The coefficient of inflation rate is positive but less 
than unity (i.e. 0.27) suggesting that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) increases 
policy rate by 0.27 basis points when there is one percent increase in inflation in Sri 
Lanka. This finding clearly indicates that CBSL does not following the Taylor rule in the 
short-run. The reason could be that in Sri Lanka formal financial system is dominated by 
the commercial banks and the monetary authority mainly focuses on the demand for and 
supply of reserve money [CBSL (2010)]. As a result, monetary policy instruments, such 
as interest rate and open market operations are used to achieve monetary targets. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that dominance of commercial banks and information 
asymmetries leads dominance of credit channels in transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy rather than the interest rate channels. The positive and significant coefficient of 
output gap implies that the CBSL stabilises real economic activity besides the price 
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stability. Real exchange rate depreciation enters in the monetary policy reaction function 
with positive sign and statistically significant which verifies a dominant role of real 
exchange rate in the monetary policy in Sri Lanka. The positive and significant 
coefficient of foreign interest rate implies that Sri Lankan financial markets are integrated 
with the rest of the world and its monetary policy is dependent of monetary policies of 
the developed countries. Therefore, it appears that Sri Lankan monetary authority 
significantly react to changes in foreign interest rate. The coefficient on lagged dependent 
variables is 0.75 which show that there is high degree of interest rate smoothing in 
monetary policy instrument by the CBSL. The variable that represents external shock 
(D08) remains negative and significant in the monetary policy in Sri Lanka. This implies 
that domestic policy interest rate depresses in the wake of external shocks. In the long-
run, the coefficients of inflation and output gap equals 1.12 and 1.00 which confirms the 
stability condition for the Taylor rule. 
 
4.3.  Discussion of Results 
The empirical findings of this study confirm that over the years the Taylor 
principle has not been pursued in its entirety in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as the 
Central Banks in these countries have not adequately reacted to inflationary pressures.
29
 
The reason for this weak support for the Taylor rule may lie in model uncertainty, fear of 
financial market disruption, and/ or the fear of loss of credibility due to sudden policy 
reversals [Carare and Tchaidze (2005)]. This weakness in monetary policy response may 
have encouraged inflation rate to be significantly influenced by large movements of 
interest rates after the introduction of financial sector reforms in the region.  In all 
probability the regional Central Banks may have accommodated some of the non-
monetary price pressures to reduce output costs [Coorey, et al. (1998); Pujal and Griffiths 
(1998)] emanating from factors such as the use of contemporaneous reaction function, 
ignoring the normal lags associated with the operation of monetary policy, use of call 
money rate/ treasury bill rate as a proxy of policy rate [Patra and Kapur (2012)], use of 
industrial output as activity variable  rather than overall GNP/ GDP, and finally, the 
relative fiscal dominance in regional economies due to less than full independence of 
respective Central Banks. 
Earlier studies have confirmed that the stability of monetary policy rule depends 
on the underlying structure of the economy [Moura and de Carvalho (2010)]. Bullard and 
Mitra (2001) and Woodford (2003) have stressed upon the importance of output gap 
coefficient along with the coefficient of inflation. In addition, they also consider firm’s 
intertemporal discount factor and the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve as 
relevant parameters. Thus, within a broader perspective, the smaller than unity inflation 
coefficient does not necessarily means failure of Central Banks to apply the Taylor 
principle [Moura and de Carvalho (2010)]. Viewed holistically, one may therefore argue 
that the RBI, the SBP, and the CBSL have shown some commitment to stabilise inflation. 
It is worth mentioning here that the coefficient on output gap remains positive 
and significant for India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which implies that monetary 
authorities in  these countries are emphasise more on the underlying demand pressure 
 
29Taylor principle predicts that for the stability of macroeconomic system, the coefficient of inflation 
should be greater than unity.   
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in setting interest rates. The insignificant coefficient of output gap for the case of 
Bangladesh implies that monetary policy has no effect on the real output [Jakab, et 
al. (2006); Vonnak (2007)].  Thus, the RBI, SBP and CBSL may focus more on 
inflation and output stabilisation.  
The positive and significant response of monetary policy to foreign interest rate for 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka suggests that monetary policy of major SAARC countries 
is largely influenced by the leading economies of the world, particularly the US monetary 
policy.  However, the estimates of foreign interest rate are less than unity suggesting that 
the interest rate arbitrage has not been working fully—an indication of limited 
international capital mobility to these countries. This result also indicates weak linkages 
between domestic financial markets of the SAARC countries and the rest of the world 
because domestic capital markets are not sufficiently developed. 
In an effort to understand whether the monetary authority uses interest rate 
instrument to lean against exchange rate movements, the coefficient of real exchange 
rate depreciation was introduced in the model specification. The positive and 
significant coefficient for India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka imply that these economies 
use interest rate as an instrument to defend the values of their respective currencies. 
Since the real exchange rate depreciation appears in the monetary policy reaction 
function with positive and greater than unity coefficient, it is clear that exchange rate 
is being used as an alternative instrument of monetary policy to control inflation. 
Finally, the response of SAARC countries to global financial crisis of 2008 seems to 
be minimal and mixed. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In recent years there is growing interest for adopting inflation targeting policy 
in most of the emerging economies. The adoption of alternative monetary policy 
strategy nonetheless requires necessary understanding as to how monetary policy 
shocks are absorbed by key macroeconomic variables. In this context, the present 
study has developed a link between monetary policy rate, real output gap, inflation 
rate, real exchange rate movements and foreign interest rate to investigate monetary 
policy stance in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the leading countries of 
SAARC using quarterly data for the period 1990Q1-2012Q4. Our results have found 
a weak support of the Taylor rule in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh 
appears to have adopted interest rate smoothing policy. These finding implies that 
simple Taylor rule may not be enough to conduct monetary policy in these countries. 
We augment the simple Taylor rule by foreign interest rate and real exchange rate 
depreciation and the results reveal that inflation rate, output gap, foreign interest rate 
and real exchange rate significantly influencing the monetary policy rate. It appears 
from the results that monetary authorities in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have taken 
accommodating stance of monetary policy towards price shocks. However, in these 
countries there exists a strong response of the interest rate to exchange rate 
movements. This reflects that Central Banks in these countries stabilising the 
exchange rate by the use of monetary policy instruments. The findings of present 
study have important policy implications. First, there is a need to stabilise real output 
besides inflation. Second, foreign interest rate is found to be a significant factor in 
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monetary policy setting in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka which implies that monetary 
policy in these countries is partially dependent on the FED’s monetary policy 
actions.
30
 Hence, monetary policy in these countries requires the inclusion of Federal 
Funds rate in the monetary policy reaction function to absorb external shocks. It is 
well documented that inclusion of the relevant external variables in the monetary 
policy specification and controlling for external shocks may reduces the biases. 
Therefore, there is a need to augment monetary policy reaction function by the 
inclusion of foreign interest rate. Third, exchange rate changes appear to be most 
significant and dominant factor in the monetary policy function which supports the 
effectiveness of exchange rate channel in the transmission mechanism. Therefore, it 
is suggested that India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka may target exchange rate together 
with the interest rate to stabilise output and inflation.  Fourth, sudden shocks, such as 
global financial crisis do affect domestic economies, therefore, the respective 
monetary authorities may need to strengthen their shock absorptive capacity. To this 
end, further regulations may be needed to improve the efficiency of domestic 
financial markets.  Fifthly, besides domestic factor, external factors such as foreign 
interest rate and exchange rate influences domestic monetary policy in the major 
SAARC countries. Therefore, these economies may have to specify broader monetary 
policy reaction functions by considering foreign interest rate and exchange rate 
movements. Finally, performance of the Taylor rule could be improved by 
augmenting some other variables in the monetary policy reaction function such as 
asset prices, private sector credit, foreign exchange reserves, foreign output gap, 
expectations and oil price volatility. It is worth mentioning here that parameters of 
the augmented Taylor rule may changes when one employs a different specification. 
On the whole, this study provides interesting evidence on the historical conduct of 
monetary policy in the SAARC countries, preparing for the adoption of alternative 
monetary policy strategy to tackle unanticipated inflationary fluctuations.  
 
 
30 In response of various financial crisis and recession, the FED reduced overnight Federal Funds rate 
target to a range between zero and 25 basis points in December 2008. The Federal Open Market Operation 
Committee (FOMC) lowered the interest rate on reserves to 25 basis points and the Federal Funds rate has 
traded close to, but still below, the rate on excess reserves. Through the FED introduced a corridor system. In 
such system, the target for the Federal Funds rate would be typically set within the corridor established by the 
discount rate at the ceiling and the interest rate on excess reserves at the floor. Through this system FED 
adopted highly accommodative monetary policy stance unit 2015 [Kahn (2010)].  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2A 
Empirical Verification of an Extended Taylor Rule (OLS Results) 
Bangladesh 
*22
****
21
777.7]000.0[17.7187.088.0
)339.2()411.7()883.0()948.0()006.0()225.0()235.2(
428.0307.1623.1026.00002.0004.0853.0


 
ADFFRR
iiqiyi ttt
f
tttt
 
India  
*22
*****
1
829.8]000.0[83.731.036.0
)760.4()178.1()143.2()236.0()814.1()727.1(
402.0512.9473.0046.0255.0705.1

 
ADFFRR
iqiyi tt
f
tttt
 
Pakistan 
*422.979.080.0
)311.2()039.2()587.2()990.1()546.1()493.3(
312.0391.0090.0163.0178.0271.0
22
*******
21

 
ADFRR
iiqiyi ttt
f
tttt
 
Sri Lanka 
*22
********
21
544.8]000.0[60.9588.089.0
)863.3()160.11()837.1()406.2()904.1()637.2()120.2(
336.0136.1037.1180.0091.0097.0056.1


 
ADFFRR
iiqiyi ttt
f
tttt
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the t-values. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 
10 percent level of significance. ADF is unit root test applied on the residuals obtained from the estimated 
equations for each country. Critical values are tabulated by Hamilton (1994). 
 
Table 2B 
Misspecification Test Statistics 
Country 
AR 1–5 
Test 
ARCH 1–4 
Test 
Normality 
Test 
Hetero 
Test 
Hetero-X 
Test 
RESET 
Test 
Bangladesh 1.611 
[0.177] 
2.723 
[0.038]
*
 
8.706 
[0.013]
*
 
2.681 
[0.006]
*
 
1.355 
[0.194] 
0.297 
[0.745] 
India 0.300 
[0.911] 
0.154 
[0.961] 
96.601 
[0.000]
*
 
1.075 
[0.395] 
0.744 
[0.769] 
4.402 
[0.016]* 
Pakistan 1.155 
[0.340] 
3.655 
[0.009]
*
 
28.761 
[0.000]
*
 
1.193 
[0.305] 
1.677 
[0.055] 
0.030 
[0.971] 
Sri Lanka 1.415 
[0.230] 
2.954 
[0.026]
*
 
3.259 
[0.196] 
1.200 
[0.300] 
1.139 
[0.337] 
1.247 
[0.294] 
Note: Residuals diagnostics include AR (error autocorrelation) test, Autoregressive conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH), the Normality of the Distribution of the Residuals, Heteroscedasticity 
(Hetero test and Hetero-X test) and Functional Form (RESET Test). * indicate significant at the 1 
percent level and [.] indicates p-values. 
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Table 2C 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test 
Country Specification Series ADF at Levels ADF at First Difference Decision 
Bangladesh C 
ti  –3.623 (1)
*
 –5.035 (0)* I (0) 
C 
t  –4.110 (2)
*
 –5.563 (3)* I (0) 
C 
ty  –3.030 (4)
*
 –7.971 (2)* I (0) 
C f
ti  
–2.205 (2)*** –3.297 (3)* I (0) 
C 
tq  –3.164 (3)
*
 –11.11 (1)* I (0) 
India C 
ti  –4.609 (0)
*
 –9.628 (0)* I (0) 
C 
t  –3.124 (1)
*
 –7.493 (3)* I (0) 
C 
ty  –2.882 (1)
***
 –9.659 (1)* I (0) 
C f
ti  
–2.205 (2)*** –3.297 (3)* I (0) 
C 
tq  –7.592 (0)
*
 –6.982 (4)* I (0) 
Pakistan C 
ti  –2.582 (0)
***
 –11.82 (0)* I (0) 
C 
t  –2.963 (1)
**
 –4.692 (0)*. I (0) 
C 
ty  –5.260 (1)
*
 –6.354 (3)* I (0) 
C f
ti  
–2.205 (2)*** –3.297 (3)* I (0) 
C 
tq  –3.506 (2)
*
 –7.175 (3)* I (0) 
Sri Lanka C 
ti  –3.040 (1)
*
 –5.340 (0)* I (0) 
C 
t  –4.100 (1)
*
 –3.770 (4)* I (0) 
C 
ty  –4.171 (1)
*
 –7.966 (1)* I (0) 
C f
ti  
–2.205 (2)*** –3.297 (3)* I (0) 
C 
tq  –9.135 (1)
*
 –7.762 (4)* I (0) 
Note: C stands for intercept; numbers in brackets are the optimal lags. *, ** and *** indicates significant at the 1 
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance. ADF-test is carried out using OxMatrics-6.0 Software. 
Critical values for ADF are: –3.52, –2.90 and –2.58 for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
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